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Models, Sherlock Holmes and the Emperor Claudius 
Abstract 
Recently, a number of authors have suggested that we understand scientific models in the 
same way as fictional characters, like Sherlock Holmes. The biggest challenge for this 
approach concerns the ontology of fictional characters. I consider two responses to this 
challenge, given by Roman Frigg, Ronald Giere and Peter Godfrey-Smith, and argue that 
neither is successful. I then suggest an alternative approach. While parallels with fiction are 
useful, I argue that models of real systems are more aptly compared to works that portray real 
people, like the Emperor Claudius. This approach will allow us to avoid problems with 
fictional characters. 
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1. Introduction 
Modelling forms an important part of scientific practice. It also presents us with a 
number of ontological puzzles. Consider the standard Newtonian model of the orbit of the 
earth. This model makes many simplifying assumptions: it assumes that the sun and earth are 
perfect spheres, for example, and that they are isolated from the other planets in the solar 
system. These assumptions are known to be false of the sun and earth. Indeed, no actual, 
concrete objects satisfy these assumptions. And yet scientists often talk as if there were such 
objects and as if they can find out about their properties. A scientist might say that the model 
consists of two spheres with homogenous mass distribution, for example, or she might 
discover that the orbit of the earth in the model is perfectly elliptical. 
Let us call the various assumptions and equations that scientists write down when they 
formulate a model the model description (Godfrey-Smith 2006; Weisberg 2007). When she 
uses the Newtonian model, the scientist wishes to understand a real system, namely the sun 
and earth. But not all models are like this. For example, a predator-prey model might invite 
us to consider a population consisting of two species, predator and prey, whose numbers are 
governed by certain equations, without claiming to represent any real population out in the 
world. And yet, even in these cases, scientists talk as if the model were an object whose 
behaviour they are investigating. For example, they might discover that in certain models 
general pesticides act to increase the proportion of prey to predator (Weisberg 2007, 223). 
Notice that often the very same model description is put to different uses. We might write 
down the equation for a simple harmonic oscillator simply in order to explore the properties 
of such a system, or we might use it to understand the motion of a pendulum or a chemical 
bond. 
Modelling thus presents us with certain ontological puzzles. How are we to make sense 
of the fact that a large part of scientific practice involves talking and learning about things 
that do not exist? One way to answer these questions is to insist that, while no actual, 
concrete object satisfies the scientists’ model description, there is some other object that does 
satisfy it. According to Ronald Giere (e.g. 1988), for example, theoretical models are abstract 
objects defined by scientists’ modelling assumptions. While this view has seemed attractive 
to many, it is not without problems. For example, Martin Thomson-Jones (2010) asks how 
the abstract objects posited by Giere’s account can possess the spatiotemporal properties we 
appear to attribute to models, such as following an elliptical orbit or oscillating with a certain 
time period (see also Hughes 1997; Godfrey-Smith 2006). 
Recently, a number of authors have suggested that, rather than abstract objects, 
theoretical models should instead be understood in the same way as fictional characters, like 
Sherlock Holmes. The aim of this paper is to examine this proposal in detail. The most 
obvious challenge for such an approach concerns the longstanding controversy over the 
nature of fictional characters (Section 2.1). I shall consider two ways in which proponents of 
the view have sought to respond to this challenge, and argue that neither response is 
successful (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). I will then suggest an alternative approach. While parallels 
with fiction are useful, I will argue that models of real systems are more aptly compared to 
works that portray real people, like the Emperor Claudius (Section 3.1). This approach will 
allow us to avoid problems with fictional characters (Section 3.2). 
2. The Indirect Fictions View 
2.1. Models and Fiction 
A number of authors have been struck by apparent parallels between the ontology of 
models and fiction (e.g. Godfrey-Smith 2006; Thomson-Jones 2007; Contessa 2010; Frigg 
2010a, 2010b; on models and fiction in general, see Suárez 2009). Consider the following 
passage from The Hound of the Baskervilles: 
Holmes leaned forward in his excitement and his eyes had the hard, dry 
glitter which shot from them when he was keenly interested. (Conan Doyle 
1902/2003, 22) 
Like scientists’ model descriptions, it seems, there is no actual, concrete object that this 
passage describes: there is no real, flesh-and-blood detective that satisfies the description 
Conan Doyle gives of Holmes. And yet, just as scientists talk as if there were objects that 
satisfied their model descriptions, so we talk as if there were a Sherlock Holmes: we say that 
Holmes is highly intelligent, that he smokes a pipe and plays the violin. We saw above that 
some have criticised Giere’s view on the grounds that we often ascribe spatiotemporal 
properties to models. We certainly have no problem attributing spatiotemporal properties to 
fictional characters: we say that Holmes is tall and that he lived at 221B Baker Street. 
These observations motivate what I will call the indirect fictions view of modelling 
(figure 1).
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 According to this view, scientists’ model descriptions give rise to what are called 
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 Here I use ‘indirect’ in a different sense to Michael Weisberg (2007). Weisberg uses the 
term ‘indirect’ to describe the activity of modelling, in order to distinguish it from other 
forms of theorising. I use ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ to distinguish between two different 
model systems (or sometimes simply models), and these model systems are to be understood 
in the same way as fictional characters like Sherlock Holmes. When scientists represent a real 
system they do so by establishing some form of representation relation between the model 
system and the real system. Different views are advanced regarding the nature of this relation. 
Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) follows Giere (e.g. 1988) in talking of resemblance between 
model systems and the world, while Roman Frigg (2010b) speaks of a ‘key’ which specifies 
how facts about the model system are translated into claims about the real system. 
 
Figure 1: The indirect fictions view 
The biggest challenge for the indirect fictions view concerns the ontology of model 
systems. After all, the nature of fictional characters is far from clear. Realists argue that, even 
if he is not a regular, flesh-and-blood detective, we must grant that Holmes exists in some 
sense. Holmes, along with Emma Bovary, Middle Earth and the rest, are therefore given a 
place in our ontology as fictional entities. Realists then offer different accounts of the nature 
of these entities. Meinong (1904/1960), for example, famously distinguishes being from 
existence. On this view, Holmes is an object possessing all the properties that we normally 
take him to have, such as being a detective and smoking a pipe; he simply lacks the property 
of existence. By contrast, antirealists, like Russell (1905/1956), aim to show how we can 
                                                                                                                                                        
interpretations of the ontology of modelling: the former takes representation to occur via a 
model system, and the latter does not. 
understand fictional characters, and our talk about them, without granting the existence of 
fictional entities. 
Proponents of the indirect fictions view have responded to this problem in a number of 
ways. Some look to existing theories of fictional characters. Thus, Roman Frigg (2010a, 
2010b) aims to fill out the view by drawing on an existing antirealist theory of fiction. Ronald 
Giere (2009) suggests a different strategy. Although, in his earlier work, Giere takes models 
to be abstract objects, he has recently suggested that he too is willing to think of models as 
akin to fictional characters. But Giere argues that philosophers of science need not be too 
concerned with the question of exactly what such entities are. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) 
appears to endorse a similar strategy.  
Let us now consider both of these responses in turn. 
2.2. Antirealism and the Indirect Fictions View 
Roman Frigg (2010a, 2010b) has proposed a version of the indirect fictions view that 
draws on an influential theory of fiction due to Kendall Walton (1990). On Frigg’s view, 
model descriptions give rise to model systems, and these model systems are ‘akin to 
characters and places in literary fiction’ (2010b, 100). Frigg acknowledges, however, that 
without a theory of fictional characters ‘explaining model systems in terms of fictional 
characters amounts to explaining the unclear with the obscure’ (2010a, 256). It is for this 
reason that he looks to Walton’s theory. 
According to Walton, the text of a novel functions as a ‘prop’ in games of make-believe: 
when we read the text, we are supposed to imagine things according to certain rules (1990, 
chap. 2). Frigg offers an application of Walton’s theory to scientists’ model descriptions. On 
Frigg’s view, when we read the model description given by the Newtonian model of the solar 
system, for example, 
[w]e imagine the entity described in the description.... We understand the 
terms occurring in the description and we imagine an entity which has all 
the properties that the description specifies. The result of this process is the 
model system, the fictional scenario which is the vehicle of our reasoning: 
an imagined entity consisting of two spheres, etc. (2010b, 133; author’s 
emphasis) 
Frigg calls the relationship between the model description and the model system ‘p-
representation’ (2010a, 264). When scientists want to represent a real system, like the sun and 
earth, they must establish a second representation relation between their model system and 
the world, which he calls ‘t-representation’ (ibid.). 
Frigg’s aim, then, is to flesh out the indirect fiction view by drawing on an existing 
theory of fictional characters. The choice of Walton’s theory for this task is a little surprising, 
however. The reason it is surprising is that Walton is an antirealist about fictional characters 
(1990, chap. 10). In Walton’s view, works of fiction may seem to ask us to imagine things 
about people like Sherlock Holmes, and we may seem to be able to talk about them. But there 
simply are no such things, not even as Meinongian nonexistent entities. So if we were to 
understand model systems in the same way that Walton understands fictional characters then 
it seems that we would conclude that there are no model systems. 
Frigg intends to follow Walton in his antirealism (2010a, 264; 2010b, 120). An antirealist 
stance on model systems is difficult to reconcile with Frigg’s overall, indirect account of 
modelling, however. Model systems have a central place in that account: scientists use model 
systems to represent real systems (t-representation). According to Frigg’s account of t-
representation, a model system X represents some real target system Y if and only if X 
denotes Y and ‘X comes with a key K specifying how facts about X are to be translated into 
claims about Y’ (2010b, 126). This might involve, for example, specifying ‘object-to-object 
correlations’, such as that ‘the sphere with mass me in the model system corresponds to the 
earth and the sphere with mass ms to the sun’ (ibid., 134). Once we have specified such 
correlations 
we can then start translating facts about the model system into claims about 
the world. For instance, calculations reveal that the model-earth moves on 
an ellipse, and given that the model system is an ideal limit of the target we 
can infer that the real earth moves on a trajectory that is almost an ellipse. 
(ibid., 135) 
If taken literally, however, all of these claims about t-representation would seem to be 
inconsistent with antirealism. If there are no model systems then there can be no facts about 
them and we cannot establish an object-to-object relation between model systems and the 
world. If there is no model-earth then it cannot move on an ellipse. 
One way to reconcile Frigg’s account with antirealism would be to offer some antirealist 
reinterpretation of what Frigg says about t-representation, which explains away the apparent 
commitment to fictional entities. If we were to take this route, however, all talk of using 
model systems to denote real systems, or of specifying object-to-object correlations between 
the two, would now be construed merely as a way of talking, rather than as offering an 
account of how modelling actually works. 
Another option would be to abandon antirealism. Frigg suggests that he is open to this 
possibility (2010b, 113). And, in fact, Frigg’s analysis of model systems differs from 
Walton’s analysis of fiction at a number of points, and sometimes seems at odds with 
antirealism. For example, he writes that ‘the attribution of certain concrete properties to 
models … is explained as it being fictional that the model system possesses these properties’ 
(2010b, 116; see also 2010a, 261). On Walton’s theory, however, to say that it is fictional that 
the model system possesses certain properties is to say that we are to imagine that the model 
system possesses those properties. This would seem to conflict with antirealism: we cannot 
imagine things about model systems if there are none. However, if Frigg were to reject 
antirealism, and grant that we must posit fictional entities to serve as model systems, it seems 
that he would need to provide an account of what fictional entities are. And drawing on 
Walton’s theory will not help to provide such an account. 
2.3. Deferring the Problem 
So the key challenge remains: can proponents of the indirect fictions view flesh out the 
comparison between model systems and fictional characters by providing a coherent account 
of what fictional characters are? As we saw earlier, however, some have argued that this 
challenge need not be met. In fact, they claim, worries about the ontology of fictional 
characters need not concern philosophers of science. For example, in his recent work, Ronald 
Giere grants that scientific models and fictional characters are ontologically ‘on a par’ (2009, 
249). But he questions ‘whether we, as philosophers of science interested in understanding 
the workings of modern science, need a deeper understanding of imaginative processes and of 
the objects produced by these processes’ (ibid., 250). Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) appears to 
endorse a similar attitude. Rather than defending any particular account of the ontology of 
fictional characters, he suggests that we might accept such objects as part of the ‘folk 
ontology’ of scientific modelling, even if in the long run we require an account of these 
objects ‘for general philosophical reasons’ (2006, 735). 
I am sympathetic to this attitude. Later (Section 3.2) I will suggest that philosophers of 
science may indeed defer questions concerning fictional characters to philosophers of fiction. 
The important point to notice, however, is that this route is not open to those who defend the 
indirect fictions view. This view gives fictional characters a central place in modelling: on the 
indirect fiction view, scientists represent the world via fictional characters. To understand 
scientific representation we must therefore understand the relationship between a fictional 
character and the world. It is difficult to see how we could understand how such things 
represent without first understanding what they are. 
For example, both Giere and Godfrey-Smith describe the relationship between model 
systems and the world in terms of similarities or resemblances between the two. If their 
accounts of the model-world relationship are to be taken literally then this will clearly place 
constraints on the account of fictional characters we can adopt: it must be a realist account, 
on which there are fictional entities and these entities can be said to possess properties such 
as mass or velocity. If we wanted to take a different view of fictional characters then all talk 
of similarity or resemblance between model systems and the world would have to be radically 
reinterpreted. If defenders of the indirect fictions view wish their accounts of scientific 
representation to aspire to truth, rather than being merely convenient stories, then it seems 
that they cannot leave fictional characters to philosophers of fiction. 
3. A Direct Fictions View 
3.1. Models and Fiction Revisited 
As we have seen, some models (like the model of the sun and earth) represent real 
systems while others (like our predator-prey model) do not. The indirect fictions view 
suggests that we understand both in the same way: in each case, it is argued, the function of 
the scientists’ model description is to create a model system, which is akin to a fictional 
character. The only difference between the two sorts of cases concerns what the scientists do 
with the model system afterwards. When they model an actual system, scientists establish 
another representation relation between the model system and the world. 
I think that these are the wrong parallels to draw between models and fiction. Rather than 
comparing all model descriptions to passages about fictional characters, I believe, we should 
distinguish carefully between cases where scientists model a real system and those where 
they do not. In the latter cases, model descriptions are like passages about fictional 
characters. In the former cases, however, scientists’ model descriptions are more like works 
of historical fiction, that represent real people, places and events (for a similar suggestion, see 
Cartwright 1983, chap. 7). Consider the following passage, from Robert Graves’ I, Claudius: 
Augustus assumed Antony’s Eastern conquests as his own and became, as 
Livia had intended, the sole ruler of the Roman world. (Graves 1934/2006, 
23) 
As commonly understood, this passage is not about any fictional character, but about the 
real Emperor Augustus, as well as his wife Livia, Mark Antony and the Roman Empire.
2
 
According to Walton, for example, when we read fiction that uses the names of well-known 
figures like Augustus, the names take their usual referents (1990, chap. 3). On this view, a 
novel like I, Claudius represents real people, places and events, by asking us to imagine 
propositions about them. Some of these propositions are true, such as that Augustus defeated 
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 Not all will agree with this interpretation, of course. Fortunately, we need not enter into 
that debate here. (For a helpful review, see Friend 2007.) 
Mark Antony. Others are, it seems, entirely fabricated by Graves and so probably false, such 
as that Augustus was manipulated by the scheming Livia. 
This analysis of historical fiction suggests a better way to understand models of real 
systems. Recall Frigg’s discussion of the solar system model. On his view, when we read the 
scientists’ model description we first imagine an entity, the model system, which has all the 
properties given in the description. It is only in the ‘next step’, that we ‘connect our model to 
the target-system’ (2010b, 134), by specifying that the smaller sphere in the model system 
corresponds to the earth, the larger sphere to the sun, and so on. And yet it is surely more 
natural to regard the model description as asking us to imagine things about the sun and earth 
themselves. Frigg himself writes that the description ‘tells us to regard the earth and sun as 
ideal homogeneous spheres’ (ibid., 133), for example. Why not avoid excessive 
reconstruction and take the description at its word, as asking us to imagine things about the 
(actual) earth and the (actual) sun? Specifically, we are asked to imagine that the sun and 
earth are perfect spheres with certain masses, that they interact only with each other, and so 
on. Some of this is true (e.g. that the earth and sun are massive bodies) while some is known 
to be false (e.g. that they interact only with each other). 
 
Figure 2: A direct fictions view 
In place of the indirect fictions view, then, I propose a direct account (figure 2). When 
scientists model a real system they ask us to imagine things about that system directly, not via 
any fictional model system. As we saw in Section 1, sometimes the same model description 
may be used in different ways. We might first explore the properties of the simple harmonic 
oscillator without having any real system in mind, and only later use it to understand the 
motion of the pendulum in the grandfather clock. According to the indirect view, when we 
apply the model to the pendulum, we do so by comparing our imaginary model system with 
the real pendulum. My suggestion is that another, more plausible, interpretation remains open 
to us. When we apply our model to the pendulum we simply imagine that the pendulum 
satisfies our model description. That is, we imagine that the pendulum is a point mass, that 
the force exerted on it is proportional to its displacement, and so on. 
The point being made here thus involves drawing a distinction between two different 
sorts of imaginings. Sometimes, we imagine people, places and objects that do not exist, like 
Sherlock Holmes or imaginary populations of predators and prey. Sometimes, however, we 
imagine things about real objects or people in the world, as when I imagine that the walls in 
my flat are painted a different colour, or that I play for Derby County. The mistake made by 
proponents of the indirect view, I believe, is to assume that all cases of modelling involve 
cases of the first sort of imagining. It is true that scientists sometimes conjure up imagined 
systems, just as novelists create fictional characters. But we need not assume that, when the 
scientist comes to represent the world, she must somehow use these imagined systems to do 
so. Another option remains open: the scientist may simply imagine things about the world. 
3.2. Avoiding Fictional Characters 
The direct view allows us to leave problems with fictional characters to philosophers of 
fiction. Recall that this deferral strategy is not open to the indirect view because, on that 
view, when scientists represent the world they do so via fictional characters. As a result, our 
account of scientific representation becomes dependent upon which view of the ontology of 
fictional characters we adopt. This is not the case on the direct account. On the view I have 
proposed, when scientists represent the world they do so by imagining propositions about it, 
not via a fictional character. Problems with fictional characters do still arise, but only for 
models that do not represent any real system, like our predator-prey model. And philosophers 
of science may legitimately defer these problems to philosophers of fiction. All that matters 
in these cases is that scientists are able to imagine things about objects that do not exist. 
Nobody doubts that we have this ability; the debate concerns how we are to explain it. And 
nothing in my account hinges on the outcome of this debate. 
When scientists do not model a real system, then, I suggest that we remain neutral: 
perhaps we will need fictional entities to make sense of model descriptions, or perhaps not. 
Where scientists model a real system, however, we can be clear: there is no need to posit 
entities that satisfy the scientists’ model descriptions. The model description asks us to 
imagine propositions about a real system, and many of these propositions are false. But 
nothing in this requires us to posit any fictional entity. 
As we have seen, however, scientists often talk as if there were an object that satisfies 
their model description. How can the direct account make sense of this? One answer is 
suggested by Adam Toon (2010, 2012). Toon also draws on Walton’s theory of fiction, but 
the main ideas behind his analysis may be summarised briefly here. When scientists talk 
about theoretical models as objects, Toon suggests, we should not take this talk too seriously. 
Instead, they are pretending, ‘going along with’ the model in order to tell us what we are to 
imagine. For example, suppose we say that in the model the sun and earth are isolated from 
the other planets. When we say this we are not describing any abstract or fictional object; we 
are simply saying that the model tells us to imagine that the sun and earth are isolated from 
the other planets. 
Toon’s analysis also suggests a way in which the direct account might explain how it is 
that we can learn about a model. Our initial model description asks us to imagine that certain 
assumptions are true of the sun and earth, such as that they are perfect spheres and that the 
force between them obeys Newton’s law of gravitation. If we accept these initial 
assumptions, however, we are also required to imagine further things, which follow from 
those assumptions. For example, we are to imagine that the earth moves in an ellipse, since 
this follows from the equation of motion that we write down. That the earth moves in an 
ellipse is therefore part of the content of the model, even though this was not specified 
explicitly in the model description. On this view, then, learning about a model is not a matter 
of discovering facts about an abstract or fictional object. Instead, we learn about a model by 
exploring the intricate web of imaginings which it prescribes. 
4. Conclusion 
Parallels with fiction offer useful tools for understanding scientific models. But we 
should be careful what parallels we draw. Comparing all model descriptions to passages 
about fictional characters yields an implausible interpretation of what scientists are doing 
when they model a real system, and leads us to longstanding disputes over the nature of 
fictional characters. A more plausible approach looks to fiction about real people, places and 
events. On this view, when scientists model a real system, they represent that system directly 
by asking us to imagine it in a certain way, and not via any fictional character. As a result, 
philosophers of science may leave problems with Sherlock Holmes to philosophers of fiction. 
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